This book presents selected addresses presented before the Personalist Discussion Group meetings held in conjunction with the annual meetings of The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. It includes the central ideas of American Personalistic Idealism developed during the twentieth century, its major criticisms, and recent developments by philosophers who are either Personalistic Idealists of sympathetic to the position.

An eighth-century Latin version of a Greek edition of Aratus preserves valuable ancient scholarship on the Phaenomena, including material not preserved in Greek. Examination of over thirteen thousand Latin–Greek correspondences enables one to interpret passages of the Latin that have so far resisted analysis, including information about an ancient edition equipped with critical signs and commentary, ancient discussion of the primary narratee in Aratus and Homer, and the alternative proem to Anclides (SH 84).

The Watchman's bed is not ‘supervised’ by dreams; instead, fear ‘stands in attendance’. The images are medical. He is ill; dream-filled sleep would be a good doctor, but the bad doctor fear is already on the job, preventing him from sleeping well.

In November 2014 I had the pleasure of examining Bruxellensis 11377–80. This paper manuscript was owned by Pierre Pantin at his death in 1611; it occupies no. 30 in his catalogue, where the first text, on fols 1–4, was misidentified as ‘Hymni Homeri’. The next owner, André Schott, repeated the error; Omont uses a page-numeration that completely excludes the current fols 1–4.

Sophocles, fr. 316 comprises matching entries in Photius,Lex.p. 489 Porson and theSudaρ166, which are thought to derive from Pausanias the Atticist's dictionary. Erbse presents the following text (ρ5):ῥικνοῦσθαι: τὸ διέλκεσθαι καὶ παντοδαπῶς διαστρέφεσθαι κατ' εἶδος. λέγεται δὲ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γίγνεσθαι ἀσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ συνουσίαν καὶ ὄρχησιν, κάμπτοντα τὴν ὀσφῦν. Σοφοκλῆς Ἰχνευταῖς.

The epitome of Athenaeus does not retain all the details of how these comic fragments were embedded in the conversation which Athenaeus originally presented, though the extract's first sentence shows that one purpose was to exemplify the application of βρέχω to drinking. Editors of both Athenaeus and Eubulus have left the connection of the latter's fragment to its conversational context at that. I submit that what follows in the epitome, as well as what precedes, casts light both on that connection (...) and on how we should restore the text. (shrink)

The present paper aims to review the value of Action Research in the evolution of sustainable mHealth. On the one hand, mHealth is a medically and economically massively expanding domain. On the other hand, the mHealth development suffers from a serious lack of sustainability, which has become particularly evident through the concept of “pilotitis.” The proposed methodological remedy shows a high congruence to the principle of AR. A quantitative and qualitative literature research is performed. Each result from the qualitative literature (...) research is analyzed with regard to aim, main focuses of AR methodology, study results and AR contribution to mHealth development. The principles of AR with regard to mHealth development are described, showing a strong connection between corresponding methodology and effects in health care. We analyze the quantitative contribution of AR to health care in general and show the typical phases of AR healthcare implementation. Furthermore, a quantitative literature research reveals that AR contributes to 6 % of mHealth publications. Our qualitative literature research discovers 27 studies dealing with AR contributions to mHealth. Main subjects of the direct contributions are Health Information Systems, Surgery, Conservative/internal medicine, Self-help and Medical Education. In summary, our review shows that AR contributes qualitatively and quantitatively to the mHealth development and that AR has a special potential to generate sustainable mHealth solutions.GraphicalOpen image in new window. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities. I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment (...) to the kind of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a detailed examination of Margaret Macdonald's response to the Cartesian sceptical argument from dreaming. I show that Macdonald's views were not well understood by her contemporaries, and I suggest that this misunderstanding has led to her omission from subsequent discussions of this subject. I end with a brief demonstration of the fact that Macdonald's central claims have re-emerged in contemporary epistemology.

I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect (...) to propositional unity. (shrink)

The International Society of Krishna Consciousness, commonly known as the Hare Krishna Movement, has disseminated a flurry of antievolutionist media since its inception in 1966. Such communications frequently co-opt arguments employed by Christian creationists and Intelligent Design theorists. At the same time, however, there are indications that a scattering of ISKCON publications have articulated relatively ambiguous, less oppositional statements about evolutionary theory. This article reconsiders ISKCON's Darwin-skepticism by appraising recent, largely unexamined Hare Krishna publications, as well as responses to evolutionary (...) theory expressed by ISKCON's founder, A. C. Bhaktivedanta, and his immediate Vaishnava forerunners. The analysis reveals that, although the majority of contemporary ISKCON materials are vehemently opposed to evolution, some leading voices demonstrate less combative, cautiously accommodating stances. These cases are suggestive of complexities in ISKCON's responses to evolution, both past and present, which are not necessarily encapsulated in the terms Vedic creationism or antievolutionism. (shrink)

In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...) that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate. (shrink)

It is well appreciated that Moore, in the final years of the nineteenth century, emphatically rejected the monistic idealism of F. H. Bradley. It has, however, been less widely noticed that Moore’s concern to defeat monism remained with him well into the 1920s. In the following discussion I describe the role that Moore’s adoption of a ‘common sense’ orientation played in his criticisms of Bradley’s monism. I begin by outlining certain distinctive features of Bradley’s sceptical methodology, before describing the contrasting (...) approach of Moore as it appears in 1910-11 and 1925. I bring these methodological differences into relief by assessing the status of common sense claims in the work of each figure. I show that Moore’s common sense methodology was employed against Bradley’s monistic conclusions, and that it was adopted with Bradley squarely in mind. (shrink)

In this article I describe the contributions made by Samuel Alexander to the issue of relations which so vexed Bertrand Russell and F. H. Bradley in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I provide a novel understanding of Alexander’s position concerning relations and describe the way in which he viewed his position as superior to those of Bradley and Russell. I offer, therefore, a more complete picture of a philosophical debate central to the relevant period, through the introduction of (...) a third character whose views have been largely omitted from available narratives. (shrink)

In this discussion I argue that Peter Sullivan is wrong to suggest that Wittgenstein's position in the Philosophical Investigations involves a commitment to transcendental idealism. I show that Sullivan's interpretation involves holding that transcendental idealism was employed by Wittgenstein in the attempt to combat a Platonist mythology. I show, through a detailed appraisal of Wittgenstein's discussion of samples, that Wittgenstein's approach to Platonism does not involve any such employment of transcendental idealism. I conclude that there is no such motivation as (...) Sullivan finds in Wittgenstein for endorsing transcendental idealism, and that we ought not, therefore, ascribe to him such a view. (shrink)

Motto-goals describe a desired mind-set and provide a person with a guiding principle of how to approach a personal goal or obligation. We propose that motto-goals can be conceptionalized as individually created metaphors and that the figurative, metaphorical language and the characteristics of the formation process make them effective in changing the perception of unpleasant personal obligations as more inherently enjoyable and raise vitality levels. To test whether a newly devised minimalistic motto-goal intervention can make goal striving more attractive and (...) energize goal-oriented action in relation to an unpleasant obligation, two experimental studies were conducted. In Study 1 the motto-goal condition led to stronger anticipation of activity related incentives and vitality compared to a distraction task. The effect on vitality was partially mediated by a change in feelings of autonomy. Study 2 replicated the effects compared to a placebo intervention and further found motto-goals to be specifically effective in increasing the anticipation of activity related incentives as opposed to outcome related incentives. The results support that applying motto-goals built with a newly developed minimalist motto-goal intervention can influence the subjective experience of individuals faced with a previously unpleasant obligation. (shrink)

I argue that empirical studies into the phenomenon of religious conversion suffer from conceptual unclarity owing to an absence of philosophical contributions. I examine the relationship between definition and empirical result in the social sciences, and I show that a wide divergence in conceptual approach threatens to undermine the possibility of useful comparative study. I stake out a distinctive role for philosophical treatments of studies into religious conversion. I conclude with the suggestion that use of the terms ‘convert’ and ‘conversion’ (...) may not in fact be conducive to clarity in the present context, and that subsequent studies may improve their precision through replacing them. (shrink)

I chart the philosophical development of neglected figure Margaret Macdonald and situate that development in the context of mid-century analytic philosophy more broadly. I examine Macdonald’s changing attitude towards verificationism, and show that these changing views led her, in 1950 and beyond, to a very thorough appreciation of language use as capable of being employed in the execution of distinctive kinds of performative act. I compare Macdonald’s views with the far better known work of J. L. Austin, and I emphasise (...) the extent to which she has, despite her insightful contributions, been omitted from the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this article I offer a novel explanation of Wittgenstein’s claim, in his Tractatus, that to represent the logical form of a proposition would require our being positioned outside of logic. The account here presented aims to exploit a connection, widely noticed, between the logical forms of objects and those of the propositions in which the names of those objects figure. I show that the logical forms of propositions may, on Wittgenstein’s view, be identified with places in logical space, and (...) that places in logical space are reducible to the forms of both objects and their names. I argue, though, that according to Wittgenstein the representation of a proposition’s logical form would require the existence of a place in logical space not so reducible. I conclude that on Wittgenstein’s position, the attempt to represent logical forms cannot, therefore, succeed. (shrink)

In this article I examine the dispute between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell concerning the reality of relations. I show that Bradley’s objections to Russell’s view, that there are such things as relations which serve to effect the unity of complex items, were rooted in a methodological approach which Russell did not share. On Bradley’s view, one must be able to offer reductive analyses of the items one postulates in order that commitment to those items be justified. I argue (...) that Russell expressly rejected this methodological principle of Bradley’s, and instead adopted the view that one may justifiably postulate entities if doing so aids in the illumination of mathematical truths. I show that the postulation of relations does, on Russell’s view, serve to provide that illumination. Russell held that the truths of mathematics constitute fixed data, and that philosophical positions may be judged as successful according to the extent that they possess explanatory power with respect to this data. I argue that Bradley’s and Russell’s exchanges in print, as well as in private correspondence, reflect Russell’s awareness of a fundamental difference in methodological approach. I conclude that Russell elected not to answer Bradley’s objections on their own terms, but rather rejected the methodological assumptions from which those objections emerged. (shrink)

This book is focused on what stabilizes and unifies our second nature, or that which we participants in a culture share in common. The claim is that in the triadic structure of the experience of all persons, trust is the key to the solidarity and stability of our second nature.

I provide a motivation for Wittgenstein's holding to the view that a necessary condition of an item's possessing a sense is its being capable of truth and capable of falsehood. I argue that Wittgenstein adopted the relevant view in order to defend an approach to the determination of logical truth on which the subject matter of a proposition is irrelevant to our making such a determination. This approach was itself conceived of as a remedy to that employed by Russell, and (...) to a conception of logical truth on which the axiom of reducibility counts as logically true. (shrink)

Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Social Personalism proposes that social Personalism can best provide for self-knowledge. Thomas O. Buford offers a social personalist understanding of self-knowledge which focuses on the relation of persons to each other and to the Personal, and avoids the impersonalisms that erode the dignity of persons and their moral life which characterize modern life.

Als geronnene Wiederholungen prägen Rituale unseren Alltag und unser Zusammenleben maßgeblich. Nicht von ungefähr galten sie lange Zeit als Inbegriff des Konservativen, Starren und Förmlichen. Eine gänzlich durchritualisierte Welt wäre zweifellos eine unfreie Welt. Im Zeitalter der Deregulierung, der Hyperaktivität und des Aufmerksamkeitsdefizits wird nun ihre Halt gebende und strukturierende Seite wiederentdeckt.Die AutorInnen reflektieren gesellschaftskritisch Theorien und psychoanalytische Erfahrungen rund um das Thema Rituale und widmen sich den folgenden Fragen: Werden Rituale zu Widerstandsnestern gegen die allgemeine Flüchtigkeit? Können sie als (...) Angelpunkte des Innehaltens und als Wegbahner unbeirrten Denkens eine neue kritische Potenz erhalten?Mit Beiträgen von Thomas Dietzel, Gesa Foken, Dirk Hofmeister, Katharina Lacina, Konrad Paul Liessmann, Nina Reis Saroldi, Elisabeth Rohr, Jochen Schade, Hans-Ernst Schiller, Edgar Weiß, Laura Wolf und Carsten Wonneberger. (shrink)

What is Plato attempting to accomplish in the Laches? A cursory reading leaves one with the strong impression that the main topic of discussion is the education of the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. However, an equally cursory survey of the major interpretations of the Laches reveals that few, if any, scholars agree with that impression. Their view is that the main topic of conversation in the Laches is courage, the examination of which takes place in the second main section (...) of the dialogue. On this view, neither the first half of the dialogue nor the concluding short section is philosophically significant since neither adds to the discussion of courage. What is left obscure on that view is what Plato is doing in these “insignificant” sections. In addition, that view does not help us to understand Plato’s emphasis on education throughout the dialogue. It seems, then, that the initial question has led to a second one: is the Laches a unity both philosophical, and philologically? Both of these questions are inextricably intertwined. The question of the unity of the Laches can be dealt with fully through a consideration of a unifying theme or argument, and the question of the integrating theme can be considered only in the light of the structure of the dialogue. I contend that a unifying thread of argument can be found in the Laches and that the traditional view of the dialogue results in cutting it into two parts having little philosophical or literary relation to each other. I propose, first, to show that the traditional interpretation is untenable, and second, to offer a counterinterpretation which avoids the necessity of regarding the first and concluding parts of the dialogue as philosophically insignificant and which provides a unifying theme. These two goals will be achieved in the following way: it will be shown that the assumption that the main conversation of the Laches is about courage implies the destruction of the unity of the Laches and leaves unclear what Plato is doing in the first half of the dialogue. And, second, a counterinterpretation will be offered showing that the central theme of the dialogue is the educational consultant. It will be shown that this theme unifies the dialogue, makes clear what Plato is doing in otherwise obscure passages, and puts into proper perspective the discussion of courage. We must now consider the traditional interpretation of the Laches. (shrink)

Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the Liberal Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality, Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought: ratio and poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis on reason, and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis on creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus (...) was on moral education. My interest, however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism. (shrink)

To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

Machine learning (ML) models recently led to major breakthroughs in predictive tasks in the natural sciences. Yet their benefits for the social sciences are less evident, as even high-profile studies on the prediction of life trajectories have shown to be largely unsuccessful – at least when measured in traditional criteria of scientific success. This paper tries to shed light on this remarkable performance gap. Comparing two social science case studies to a paradigm example from the natural sciences, we argue that, (...) in addition to explanation, prediction is an important goal of social science – and we identify constraints that impede pure ML prediction from being successful in that field. As a remedy, we outline elements of an integrative modelling approach that combines explanatory models and predictive ML models. (shrink)